School officials relayed the
instances of aggression to authorities, and the perpetrator was eventually charged
in juvenile court with assault, making terroristic threats, and
harassment. After being adjudicated
delinquent and ordered to have no further contact with the victim-students, the
aggressor was allowed to return to Blackhawk High. The bullying continued. The parents of the two victim-students brought
the continued bullying to the attention of school officials. The officials suggested that the parents
consider another school for their daughters.
The parents removed their daughters from the school and subsequently sued
the Blackhawk school district and an assistant principal for violations of
their 14th Amendment substantive-due-process rights. A ruling on the case, Morrow v. Balaski, was issued on June 5, 2013 by an en banc panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Morrow
v. Balaski, 11-2000, 2013 WL 2466892 (3d Cir. June 5, 2013).
In Morrow, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
schools have no constitutional duty to protect students from bullies. Writing for the majority, Chief Circuit Judge
Theodore A. McKee noted that the Third Circuit’s decision in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School and the Supreme Court’s rulings in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton had
set a clear precedent: there is no special relationship between public schools
and their students. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); D.R. by
L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.
1992).
In
DeShaney, a suit was brought against
a Wisconsin social services agency by the mother of a boy who was beaten and
sustained brain damage after his abusive father was given custody of him. DeShaney
489 U.S. 189 (1989). The court held that
the state did not owe its citizens a constitutional duty to protect them from
harm. Id. The court did, however,
note that there could be limited exceptions where a state's duty to protect
might exist. Id. Since the DeShaney holding, lower courts have
struggled to define these exceptions. Id.
In
Vernonia, a student and his parents
brought action against a school district, challenging the district’s policy of
requiring drug tests for athletes. Vernonia 515 U.S. 646 (1995). The Supreme Court held that although the
tests were searches under the Fourth Amendment, they were reasonable in light
of the schools' interest in preventing teenage drug use. Id. In his Morrow decision, Judge McKee quoted dicta from the Vernonia opinion, stating, “[w]e do not,
of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree
of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional “duty to
protect.’” Morrow, 2013 WL 2466892 (3d Cir. June 5, 2013) (quoting Vernonia 515 U.S. at 655).
In D.R., the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's compulsory
attendance laws and the school's exercise of in loco parentis over its students while they were in the building
did not restrain students' liberty to such a degree that they could be
considered in the custody of the state for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. D.R., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d
Cir. 1992). The case involved
allegations of sexual abuse among students in a graphic arts class. Id. Although the appeals court characterized
the facts of that case as “horrific,” it held that the school did not violate
the victim-students’ rights because the school did not have a special relationship
that would impose a constitutional duty to protect. Id.
In
a strong dissent in Morrow v. Balaski,
Judge Julio M. Fuentes stated that the majority's holding was “wrong as a
matter of law.” Morrow, 2013 WL 2466892 (2013).
Schools, he explained, exercise more control over students’ lives today
than when Middle Bucks was
decided. Id. Schools monitor students'
use of social media both inside and outside of the classroom, and they have the
power to lock students in school buildings for safety reasons in this age of
school shootings. Id.
“When
a state ... steps into the shoes of [the] parent, and restricts the ability of
the child to defend herself from a specific threat, the state ought to be seen
as incurring a narrow, concomitant responsibility to act as one would expect
the child's parents to act: to protect the child from that danger,” Fuentes
said. Id. at 35. "When a
school creates an atmosphere in which serious violence is tolerated and brings
no consequence, it acts in a manner that renders all students more
vulnerable." Id. Although the status of
the law appears settled after Morrow v.
Balaski, Judge Fuentes’ dissent proposes the possibility that one day
schools may be constitutionally bound to protect their students. Until that time, victim-students pursuing
protection from in-school bullies may have no choice but to switch schools.
The information
herein is provided for consumer educational purposes only. The statements contained herein are general
statements of law, as of the date stated, and there may be exceptions that are
not set forth below, or changes due to later legislative developments and/or
newer case law. The Nicolson Law Group
does not suggest that any provision contained herein will or must apply to any
specific issue or case. For legal
information and advice for any particular matter, you are encouraged to consult
advice from one of Nicolson Group’s licensed attorneys.